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Withdrawal: The Roberts Court and the 
Retreat from Election Law 
Ellen Katz† 
  INTRODUCTION   
Last Term the Supreme Court handed down four decisions 
that upheld diverse efforts by state governments to regulate 
the electoral process. The Court turned back challenges to New 
York’s method for nominating judicial candidates,1 Washing-
ton’s modified blanket primary system,2 Indiana’s voter identi-
fication requirement,3 and Alabama’s use of gubernatorial ap-
pointment to fill county commission vacancies in Mobile 
County.4 
Unlike other recent election decisions,5 these were not close 
cases. All nine Justices supported the New York holding,6 while 
supermajorities voted in favor of the result in the others.7 This 
consensus, moreover, emerged even as the Court voted to re-
verse unanimous decisions by experienced lower court judges in 
the Alabama,8 New York,9 and Washington cases.10 The one af-
 
†  Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. Copyright © 
2009 by Ellen Katz. 
 1. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. López Torres (López Torres III), 128 S. 
Ct. 791 (2008). 
 2. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184 
(2008). 
 3. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008). 
 4. Riley v. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. 1970 (2008). 
 5. See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 
408 (2006) (5-4 decision). 
 6. See López Torres III, 128 S. Ct. at 794. 
 7. See Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1613; Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 
1187; Riley, 128 S. Ct. at 1976. 
 8. See Riley, 128 S. Ct. at 1980. 
 9. See López Torres III, 128 S. Ct. at 797. 
 10. See Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1187. 
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firmance came in the controversial Indiana voter ID case and 
even there six Justices supported the outcome.11  
These four decisions suggest that a distinct approach to 
election law is emerging in the Roberts Court. It is an approach 
that seeks to avoid active federal engagement with the state-
created rules regulating democratic participation; and it is one 
that assumes and demands an electorate that is both legally li-
terate and diligent. This approach differs in tenor and sub-
stance from the stance the Justices have long taken in electoral 
disputes. It implicitly rejects the role the Court and Congress 
have repeatedly played in the electoral arena, and the portrait 
of the American voter on which federal involvement has pre-
viously been premised.  
This short Article develops and defends these claims. Part 
I shows how the recent decisions depart from both longstanding 
and more recent precedent in the field. While the decisions fa-
cially overrule nothing, they narrow foundational voting deci-
sions from the Warren and Burger Courts, and disavow the ri-
gorous review the Rehnquist Court repeatedly employed when 
examining challenges to state electoral processes. The decisions 
suggest a Court that is eager to withdraw from engaged judicial 
review of state election laws and receptive to circumscribed 
federal oversight of state electoral processes more generally.  
Part II shows how this federal withdrawal is animated by a 
distinct conception of the American electorate. The decisions 
last Term posit that voters did not need the federal assistance 
the plaintiffs were seeking. They all assume that voters possess 
a sophisticated understanding of the complex legal rules under 
which they act, as well as both the ability and the diligence 
needed to navigate those rules. Underlying decisions that reject 
federal challenges to electoral rules, these assumptions become 
permissible requirements for political participation. 
The Justices know full well that a good portion of the 
American electorate lacks the very characteristics on which 
meaningful political participation now appears to depend. The 
recent decisions make clear that the Court is no longer eager to 
provide assistance when voters fall short. The expectation, im-
plicit in these decisions, is that the void will be filled not by the 
States themselves, but by political parties, other nongovern-
mental organizations, and private individuals. A brief conclu-
sion explores this point. 
 
 11. See Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1613. 
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I.  STEPPING BACK   
This Part evaluates four election law decisions from last 
Term. These decisions all rejected challenges to state efforts to 
regulate the electoral process. In each case, precedent sug-
gested, though did not require, a more robust federal role. By 
letting the challenged regulations stand, all four decisions nar-
row prior precedent and minimize federal oversight of state 
electoral processes. 
 A.  NOMINATING JUDICIAL CANDIDATES 
New York State Board of Elections v. López Torres, the first 
of the four decisions the Court handed down last Term, pre-
sented the Justices with a constitutional challenge to the influ-
ence political party leaders exert within the hybrid system New 
York State employs to nominate candidates to judicial office.12 
This system relies on decentralized state-run primaries at 
which party members choose delegates who then attend party-
run conventions that select the party’s nominee.13  
Within this regime, local party leaders consistently choose 
the ultimate nominee. They do so by coordinating a slate of loy-
al delegates to run in the primary and by ensuring these slates 
satisfy New York’s hefty primary ballot access requirements.14 
These requirements functionally block opposition to the party 
slate,15 and thus the primary is routinely cancelled for lack of 
 
 12. López Torres III, 128 S. Ct. 791, 797 (2008). 
 13. See N.Y. ELEC. LAW §§ 6-134, -136(2)(i), -136(3), -160(2) (McKinney 
2007). 
 14. Under New York law, delegates run in each of the numerous assembly 
districts that comprise one of the State’s twelve judicial districts. See id. § 6-
124; López Torres v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections (López Torres I), 411 F. Supp. 
2d 212, 220–21 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), aff ’d, 462 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2006), rev’d, N.Y. 
State Bd. of Elections v. López Torres (López Torres III), 128 S. Ct. 791 (2008). 
To be placed on the primary ballot, candidates for delegate must circulate de-
signating petitions within the assembly district in which they are running. 
López Torres I, 411 F. Supp. 2d at 216 n.3. State law gives them thirty-seven 
days to gather 500 valid signatures from party members who both reside in 
that assembly district and who have not already signed another such petition. 
§§ 6-134(3), (4), -136(2)(i), (3); López Torres v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections 
(López Torres II), 462 F.3d 161, 173 (2d Cir. 2006). Because these require-
ments routinely render many obtained signatures invalid, those seeking 
access to the ballot must, as a matter of practice, obtain between 1000 and 
1500 signatures to ensure obtaining the required number of valid ones. See 
López Torres I, 411 F. Supp. 2d at 220–21. 
 15. In New York’s Second Judicial District located in Brooklyn and Staten 
Island, for example, a challenger candidate seeking to run a full slate of dele-
gates and alternates would need to enlist nearly 250 people to run, and secure 
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contest and the party slate is “deemed elected” pursuant to 
state law.16 The delegates elected on the leadership’s slate in-
variably nominate the leadership’s candidates at rote conven-
tions that last only minutes.17 Noncompetitive judicial districts 
guarantee the nominee emerging from the majority party’s 
convention will become a state supreme court justice.18  
Two lower federal courts thought this regime gave too 
much power to local party leaders. They found that the State 
structured the nominating system in a manner that actively 
and predictably gave party leaders ultimate control over the 
nomination.19 Under it, judicial candidates like plaintiff Mar-
garita López Torres—bona fide party members who meet the 
qualifications for judicial office and enjoy considerable support 
but are not favored in advance by the party leadership—are, in 
the words of the district judge, wholly unable to “clear all the 
hurdles necessary to elect supportive delegates,” and confront 
“insurmountable” obstacles in seeking to lobby the delegates 
who are selected.20  
A unanimous Supreme Court, however, saw no constitu-
tional defect.21 Some of the Justices seemed to think New 
York’s regime was bad policy,22 but they all agreed that the 
system was well within the realm of permissible structures a 
State might employ when regulating the electoral process.23 No 
 
124,000 qualified signatures from the twenty-four assembly districts that 
comprise the Second Judicial District. See López Torres I, 411 F. Supp. 2d at 
219. Accomplishing this would require obtaining nearly a quarter of a million 
signatures, based on a “conservative” estimate of the number of signatures 
that must be collected to ensure obtaining a sufficient number of valid ones. 
See id. 
 16. § 6-160(2). 
 17. See López Torres I, 411 F. Supp. 2d at 217, 223, 230. 
 18. See id. at 217 (“In most places, the nominees of a single party (either 
Democratic or Republican) win all or virtually all of the time.”); see also López 
Torres II, 462 F.3d at 178 (“Empirical evidence showed that because one-party 
rule is the norm in most judicial districts, the general election is little more 
than ceremony.”). The supreme courts of the State of New York are the state’s 
trial-level courts. 
 19. See López Torres II, 462 F.3d at 181; López Torres I, 411 F. Supp. 2d 
at 231, 233. I agreed. See Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors at 2, N.Y. State 
Bd. of Elections v. López Torres, 128 S. Ct. 791 (2008) (No. 06-766).  
 20. López Torres I, 411 F. Supp. 2d at 216–17. 
 21. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. López Torres (López Torres III), 128 S. 
Ct. 791 (2008). 
 22. Id. at 801 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 23. See id. at 800–01 (majority opinion). 
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precedent squarely blocked this holding, but several decisions 
emerged narrowed as a consequence.  
Most notably, López Torres examined New York’s regime 
solely as state statutes describe it, and disregarded how it op-
erates in practice. The Court never disagreed with the lower 
courts’ finding that New York’s system is functionally impe-
netrable to challenger candidates and their supporters.24 What 
mattered to the Justices, however, was that the process was 
and remains legally accessible.25 As Justice Scalia pointed out, 
“[n]o New York law” compels the election of the leadership’s 
slate; no law directs those elected to vote the leadership’s prefe-
rence; and no state law prohibits challenger candidates from 
attending the convention or from lobbying the delegates.26  
All this is true, to be sure. That the Court would, however, 
explicitly and unanimously deem formal, legal accessibility suf-
ficient to validate New York’s regime is something new. The 
Justices have repeatedly claimed to have engaged in precisely 
the type of analysis López Torres disavowed; that is, the Court 
has said it focuses not only the “requirements themselves” but 
also on “on the manner in which political actors function under 
those requirements.”27 Bullock v. Carter accordingly empha-
sized that a candidate filing fee must be examined “in a realis-
tic light” that includes “the extent and nature of the[] impact 
on voters.”28 Chief Justice Burger explained that, under the 
challenged regime, “potential office seekers . . . are in every 
practical sense precluded from seeking the nomination of their 
chosen party.”29 Rather than focusing exclusively on legal im-
pediments, Bullock examined the system’s “real and apprecia-
ble impact,” stressing that to do otherwise would to be “ignore 
reality” about the system’s effect in practice.30 
Bullock was not an outlier on this point. Back in United 
States v. Classic, the Court emphasized “the practical opera-
 
 24. See id. at 800 (finding “one-party entrenchment” not a valid basis for 
judicial interference). 
 25. See id. at 799. 
 26. Id.  
 27. Id.; cf. Christopher S. Elmendorf, Structuring Judicial Review of Elec-
toral Mechanics: Explanations and Opportunities, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 313, 321–
22 (2007) (arguing that “the Court’s rhetoric . . . seems to invite all-things-
considered, empirically oriented burden inquiries,” but that in practice, “the 
Court often reverts to formalism”). 
 28. 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972). 
 29. Id. (emphasis added).  
 30. Id. at 144. 
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tion” of a primary election in controlling outcomes, even as it 
observed the absence of any “effective legal prohibition” on vot-
er rejection of the primary choice in the general election.31 Lu-
bin v. Panish emphasized the need to examine “[t]he realities of 
the electoral process,”32 and American Party of Texas v. White 
rejected access that is “merely theoretical.”33 And as recently as 
Clingman v. Beaver, Justice O’Connor called for a “realistic as-
sessment of regulatory burdens on associational rights” and an 
“examination of the cumulative effects of the State’s overall 
scheme.”34  
López Torres, by contrast, steadfastly refused to examine 
the system’s cumulative effects and came close to embracing 
what Justice Stevens’s dissent in Clingman described as “emp-
ty formalism.”35 No state law prevented a challenger candidate 
like López Torres from attending the convention or lobbying 
delegates,36 but the Court knew full well that in “every practic-
al sense” she would be unable to do so.37 So too, the Court wil-
lingly “ignore[d] reality” and deemed “entirely reasonable” New 
York’s requirement that a single candidate for delegate obtain 
500 signatures before gaining access to the primary ballot.38 
The legal obstacles to a successful standalone candidacy as a 
convention delegate were certainly less onerous than those in-
volved with securing the election of a coordinated slate, but, in 
“every practical sense” pursuing such a standalone candidacy is 
pointless, given the absence of debate and discussion at that 
state-mandated convention.39  
 
 31. 313 U.S. 299, 313, 319 (1941). 
 32. 415 U.S. 709, 719 n.5 (1974). 
 33. 415 U.S. 767, 783 (1974) (citing Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 439 
(1971)). 
 34. 544 U.S. 581, 599 (2005) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 35. See id. at 610 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (emphasizing that the 
assessment “should focus on the realities of the situation, not on empty for-
malism”); cf. Christopher S. Elmendorf, N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Torres: 
Is the Right to Vote a Constitutional Constraint on Partisan Nominating Con-
ventions?, 6 ELECTION L.J. 399, 409 (2007) (predicting that the Court would 
not give “unqualified approval” to the “neither formalistic nor abstract” ap-
proach followed by the lower courts in Lopez Torres). 
 36. See N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. López Torres (López Torres III), 128 
S. Ct. 791, 799 (2008) (“[N]o state law prohibits an unsupported candidate 
from attending the convention and seeking to persuade the delegates to sup-
port her.”). 
 37. Cf. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972). 
 38. See López Torres III, 128 S. Ct. at 799. 
 39. See López Torres v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections (López Torres I), 411 F. 
Supp. 2d 212, 217, 223, 230 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), aff ’d, 462 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2006), 
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In López Torres, the Justices were nevertheless satisfied to 
limit their gaze to formal legal access, and to ignore the bur-
dens that arise in practice. In so doing, López Torres was not an 
aberration. In the decisions that followed, the Court retained 
this rigid focus on legal rather than practical impediments to 
participation. 
B.  MODIFYING THE BLANKET PRIMARY 
The Court’s next decision, Washington State Grange v. 
Washington State Republican Party,40 was the most unexpected 
of the four. Reversing two lower courts, the decision upheld as 
constitutional the Washington state law known as the People’s 
Choice Initiative (Initiative 872 or I-872).41 Court watchers 
widely anticipated an affirmance.42  
For decades, the State of Washington relied on the blanket 
primary to select party nominees for elective office.43 Under 
this system, the names of all the candidates from all parties 
appeared on a single ballot, and voters choose among them, se-
lecting, for instance, among the Democratic candidates for gov-
ernor, and among the Republicans for senator.44 The candidate 
with the highest votes by party for each office advanced to the 
general election, as the respective party’s nominee.45 In 2003, a 
federal court struck down Washington’s system, finding it “ma-
terially indistinguishable” from the blanket primary the Su-
preme Court invalidated three years earlier in California Dem-
ocratic Party v. Jones.46 There, the Justices held that 
California’s blanket primary impermissibly burdened the assoc-
iational freedom of political parties because “it forced them to 
allow nonmembers to participate in selecting the parties’ nomi-
nees.”47 
 
rev’d, N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. López Torres (López Torres III), 128 S. Ct. 
791 (2008). 
 40. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184 
(2008). 
 41. Id. at 1189–90. 
 42. See, e.g., In Shocker, Supreme Court on 7-2 Vote Upholds Washington 
State Primary, http://electionlawblog.org/archives/010463.html (Mar. 18, 2008, 
07:25 PST). 
 43. Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1187. 
 44. Id. at 1188. 
 45. Id. at 1188–90. 
 46. Democratic Party of Wash. State v. Reed, 343 F.3d 1198, 1203 (9th 
Cir. 2003). 
 47. Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1188. 
 1622 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [93:1615 
 
In 2004, voters in Washington State responded by adopting 
I-872, which provides that all candidates for a “partisan office” 
appear together on the primary ballot, with the two candidates 
receiving the most votes overall advancing to the general elec-
tion.48 This new, modified blanket primary resembles the non-
partisan primary that California Democratic Party described as 
a permissible alternative to the blanket primary.49 Washing-
ton’s system, however, added the wrinkle that it allows candi-
dates to list their party “preference” on both the primary and 
general election ballots.50  
Washington State Grange addressed whether this wrinkle 
invalidated I-872.51 Two lower courts thought it did, noting that 
the party-preference designation suggested the party had ei-
ther endorsed or nominated a candidate when it had done nei-
ther.52 Observers widely agreed that California Democratic 
Party controlled, and mandated the invalidation of I-872.53 Oral 
argument in the Supreme Court suggested an affirmance would 
be quickly forthcoming.54 
The Justices nevertheless voted 7-2 to reverse.55 Justice 
Thomas’s lead opinion emphasized that the I-872 primary did 
not “by its terms” or “on its face” select party nominees, and 
that the law made no reference to the top-two candidates “as 
nominees of any party, nor does it treat them as such.”56 Point-
ing out that the challenge before the Court was a facial one, 
 
 48. Id. at 1189. 
 49. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 598 n.8 (2000). 
 50. Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1189. 
 51. See id. at 1192–93. 
 52. See Wash. State Republican Party v. Logan, 377 F. Supp. 2d 907, 922 
(W.D. Wash. 2005), aff ’d, 460 F.3d 1108, 1125 (9th Cir. 2006), rev’d, Wash. 
State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184 (2008).  
 53. See, e.g., Joseph M. Birkenstock, Did I-872 Take Washington State’s 
Voters on an Unconstitutional Detour?: Partisanship in Primaries in Washing-
ton v. Washington State Republican Party, 6 ELECTION L.J. 394, 398 (2007) 
(questioning whether I-872 offered “a different route to the same destination 
intended by the blanket primary,” namely, taking parties “out of the business” 
of nominating candidates for office); Posting of Robert F. Bauer to American 
Constitution Society for Law and Policy Blog, http://www.acsblog.org/guest 
-bloggers-guest-blogger-does-washington-states-modified-blanket-primary-
system-violate-the-right-of-association.html (Oct. 1, 2007, 9:00 PST) (noting 
that the State of Washington faced “serious obstacles in the path toward a Su-
preme Court victory”). 
 54. See Washington State Likely to Lose Top-Two Primary Case, http:// 
electionlawblog.org/archives/009403.html (Oct. 1, 2007, 11:34 PST). 
 55. Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1187. 
 56. Id. at 1192. 
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Justice Thomas rejected as “sheer speculation” the idea that 
voters would view the top-two candidates as party nominees, 
and found “simply no basis to presume that a well-informed 
electorate” would misunderstand the system.57 Washington, 
moreover, had yet to implement this regime, and careful ballot 
design might well preclude the confusion plaintiffs argued 
would arise.58  
The decision notably suggested that the system might in 
due course be challenged if implementation proved problemat-
ic.59 While the Court has long distinguished facial from as-
applied challenges, invocation of the distinction in this context 
was unusual.60 As Justice Scalia’s dissent pointed out,61 nu-
merous decisions have examined restrictions on political partic-
ipation and expressive association without requiring specific 
evidence about the scope of the burden imposed.62 Washington 
State Grange nevertheless demanded such evidence and ap-
peared to be inviting the legal challenges that would present 
it.63  
The invitation is novel, but the innovation in practice 
promises to be limited. Washington State Grange looks like it is 
inviting a fact-intensive, time-consuming inquiry to assess how 
voters understand the top-two primary in practice.64 Few such 
inquiries, however, are likely to materialize. The Court in 
Washington State Grange did not explain how voter confusion 
might be assessed, but provided detailed recommendations of 
things the State might do to minimize such confusion.65 Wash-
 
 57. Id. at 1193. 
 58. See id. at 1194. 
 59. See, e.g., Rick Hasen, About Face: The Roberts Court Sets the Stage for 
Shrinking Voting Rights, Putting Poor and Minority Voters Especially in Dan-
ger, FINDLAW, Mar. 26, 2008, http://writ.lp.findlaw.com/commentary/ 
20080326_hasen.html. 
 60. Nathaniel Persily & Jennifer S. Rosenberg, Defacing Democracy? The 
Changing Nature and Rising Importance of As-Applied Challenges in the Su-
preme Court’s Recent Election Law Decisions, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1644, 1658–72 
(2009) (discussing the Court’s use of as-applied challenges in the election law 
context). 
 61. Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1201 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 62. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653 (2000); Hurley 
v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 577 (1995); Bur-
dick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 438 (1992); Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 
U.S. 663, 668 (1966).  
 63. See Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1193. 
 64. See id. 
 65. Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1194; id. at 1197 (Roberts, C.J., con-
curring). 
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ington State might ultimately choose to disregard this advice, 
and for instance, place the simple “D” or “R” next to the candi-
date’s name in the manner the Chief Justice’s concurrence sug-
gested would be problematic.66 Assuming, however, the State 
maintains a more compliant stance,67 a federal court is likely to 
reject in short order an as-applied challenge to the regime. Lit-
igation assessing survey data on voter perceptions remains 
possible; more likely, a court will look exclusively at the State’s 
effort and deem it sufficient.  
Supporting this speculation is the Court’s refusal to 
mandate the very thing that would most directly dispel voter 
confusion, namely, allowing the party to disavow a candidate 
on the ballot itself. Justice Scalia thought this refusal rendered 
irrelevant all questions about implementation, insisting that 
under “no set of circumstances” did the Washington regime not 
severely burden political parties.68 Seven Justices disagreed 
with him, and thereby implicitly accepted that political parties 
are not impermissibly burdened by a primary structure de-
signed to discourage what Justice Scalia called “bright-colors 
partisanship.”69 Washington State Grange posits that the State 
may rely on the top-two primary to advance this goal, and that 
doing so causes political parties no cognizable injury absent 
voter confusion. This proposition necessarily circumscribes the 
scope of the as-applied challenge the decision invites to mar-
ginal issues, and ensures the impact of such challenges will be 
negligible. Justice Scalia aptly described the task faced by 
plaintiffs seeking to displace the regime once implemented as 
“perhaps-impossible.”70  
Rather than inviting a new, unpredictable foray into the 
political thicket, Washington State Grange is better understood 
as promoting an “exit strategy” from the aggressive review that 
characterizes decisions like California Democratic Party.71 
 
 66. Id. at 1197 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
 67. See WASH. SEC’Y OF STATE, ANNOUNCING WASHINGTON STATE’S NEW 
TOP 2 PRIMARY (2008), available at http://wei.secstate.wa.gov/osos/en/ 
Documents/VP%20Top%202%20Primary%202008.pdf (explaining the top-two 
primary with a sample ballot indicating which specific party a candidate “pre-
fers”). 
 68. Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1200 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 69. Id. at 1202; see also Bauer, supra note 53 (offering views on what the 
top-two primary seeks to accomplish). 
 70. See Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1201 (Scalia J., dissenting). 
 71. Cf. Pamela S. Karlan, Exit Strategies in Constitutional Law: Lessons 
for Getting the Least Dangerous Branch Out of the Political Thicket, 82 B.U. L. 
REV. 667 passim (2002) (discussing various views of such exit strategies). 
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With reasoning that strongly suggested Washington’s top-two 
primary should be invalid,72 California Democratic Party dis-
placed a practice long used73 on the basis of a vigorous, and ar-
guably undertheorized conception of party autonomy.74 Wash-
ington State Grange treats California Democratic Party as 
settled precedent,75 but nevertheless narrows the decision by 
letting stand (for now, at least) a practice that advances the 
very same goal through a different, but hardly unrelated me-
chanism. 
In this sense, Washington State Grange curiously resem-
bles Easley v. Cromartie,76 the 2001 Rehnquist Court decision 
that effectively brought to a close the racial redistricting dis-
putes about which the Justices obsessed in the 1990s. Cromar-
tie declined to apply strict scrutiny to an oddly shaped district 
in which African Americans comprised 47 percent of the dis-
trict’s population.77 After reviewing the record’s most minute 
details, the Court concluded that partisanship best explained 
the district lines, and therefore that race had not predominated 
in the districting process.78 Commentators reacted to Cromartie 
with skepticism,79 and some predicted that the Court’s fact-
intensive approach would usher in even more intense federal 
court involvement in racial redistricting disputes.80  
 
 72. See supra text accompanying notes 46, 49. 
 73. The practice was not, however, long used in California. See Cal. Dem-
ocratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 570 (2000) (describing the relatively re-
cent adoption of the blanket primary by California voters). 
 74. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Private Parties with Public Purposes: Po-
litical Parties, Associational Freedoms, and Partisan Competition, 101 COLUM. 
L. REV. 274, 282–98 (2001); see also Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1188.  
 75. See Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1192. 
 76. 532 U.S. 234, 237 (2001). 
 77. See id. at 240, 258. 
 78. See id. at 243–44. 
 79. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, Confounded by Cromartie: Are Racial Stereo-
types Now Acceptable Across the Board or Only When Used in Support of Par-
tisan Gerrymanders?, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 489, 496 (2002) (describing the 
Court’s “predominant purpose” test as “indeterminate to the point of incohe-
rence”); Karlan, supra note 71, at 677 (“[Cromartie] cannot be explained in any 
sort of principled terms that provide guidance for future cases.”). 
 80. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Easing the Spring: Strict Scrutiny and Af-
firmative Action After the Redistricting Cases, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1569, 
1593 (2002) (reading Cromartie as evidence that because the Court “seems to 
have committed itself to conducting serious factual review, and that Shaw 
cases will remain a stalking horse for various partisan interests, the deluge of 
cases is likely to continue”). 
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And yet, the deluge of racial gerrymandering challenges 
anticipated after the post-2000 round of redistricting never ma-
terialized.81 While Cromartie analyzed the record in excruciat-
ing detail, the decision also provided significant guidance to 
States working on redistricting plans, instructing them, in ef-
fect, to tone down racial references, use race less bluntly, and 
rely on party affiliation to the extent possible when drawing 
district lines.82 By and large, States heeded the advice, with the 
tight connection between race and political affiliation enabling 
informed line drawers to immunize most districting plans from 
constitutional challenges.83  
Washington State Grange promises to function similarly. 
The decision reads like a “dodge,”84 inviting what appears to be 
an expansive, time consuming project that will burden the fed-
eral courts. But the decision provides advice much like that of-
fered less expressly in Cromartie. If heeded, this advice promis-
es to limit, rather than encourage, federal court involvement in 
future disputes.  
The Court, no doubt, intends as much. Following on the 
heels of López Torres, the decision continues the Court’s reluc-
tance to mire itself in the minutiae of state election law. To be 
sure, López Torres let stand a regime that greatly empowered 
party organizations, while Washington State Grange preserved 
a state regime that actively sought to undermine those same 
entities. Uniting the two, however, is the Court’s commitment 
to stay out of it. 
C.  REQUIRING VOTER IDENTIFICATION 
By far the most prominent of the election disputes before 
the Court last Term, Crawford v. Marion County Election 
Board85 synthesized key elements of the Court’s approach in 
the two previous cases. Crawford continued the Court’s rigid 
focus on legal restrictions over practical effects, making clear 
that López Torres was not an aberration on this point.86 Craw-
 
 81. Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term–Foreword: The 
Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 28, 67 n.172 
(2004). 
 82. See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 257–58 (2001). 
 83. See Pildes, supra note 81, at 67–68. 
 84. Bob Bauer, Political Parties in the Soup, at the Supreme Court, MORE 
SOFT MONEY HARD LAW, Mar. 19, 2008, http://moresoftmoneyhardlaw.com/ 
updates/the_supreme_court.html?Archive=1&AID=1221. 
 85. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008). 
 86. Id. at 1622–23. 
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ford, moreover, followed Washington State Grange both by dis-
tinguishing facial from as-applied challenges, and by suggest-
ing the latter will encompass few, if any, successful claims.87 
Crawford affirmed the validity of the Indiana voter identi-
fication requirement88 many observers deemed to be the most 
severe of the ID requirements states have enacted in recent 
years.89 Joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy, 
Justice Stevens’s lead opinion held that the State’s interest in 
things like preventing voter fraud and protecting voter confi-
dence justified the burdens the requirement imposed.90 The 
opinion noted the plaintiffs’ allegation that “a small number of 
voters . . . may experience a special burden under the statute,” 
but found no basis in the record to quantify either the burden’s 
magnitude or the portion of it that is “fully justified.”91 The 
record as it stood, Justice Stevens wrote, did not support the al-
legation that the statute imposed “excessively burdensome re-
quirements,” emphasizing that “[a] facial challenge must fail 
where the statute has a ‘plainly legitimate sweep.’”92  
Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Alito and Thomas, agreed 
that Indiana’s law was valid, but thought the inquiry should be 
a categorical one in which the “peculiar circumstances of indi-
vidual voters” were legally irrelevant.93 According to Justice 
Scalia, Indiana’s voter ID requirement imposed a single burden 
on all voters, namely to present photo identification in order to 
vote in person.94 The reality that some voters will be able to 
comply more easily than others simply reflects “the different 
impacts of the single burden” uniformly imposed, and not mul-
tiple burdens that warrant particularized judicial scrutiny.95 
Justice Scalia nevertheless concurred in the judgment because 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 1624. 
 89. See It Could Have Been Worse, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/blogs/tokaji/ 
2008_04_01_equalvote_archive.html (Apr. 29, 2008, 06:53 EST) (referring to 
Indiana’s law as “probably the strictest and most exclusionary voter ID law in 
the country”). 
 90. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1617–21. 
 91. Id. at 1622. 
 92. Id. at 1623 (quoting Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican 
Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1190 (2008)). 
 93. Id. at 1624–25 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 94. See id. at 1625. 
 95. See id. 
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he deemed the single burden at issue imposed by the state law 
to be “minimal and justified.”96  
 Justice Souter, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice 
Ginsburg, catalogued the various difficulties voters lacking 
conventional forms of ID would confront in seeking to comply 
with the statute, and argued that these difficulties gave rise to 
“an unreasonable and irrelevant burden.”97 Justice Breyer also 
dissented, emphasizing why he thought the Indiana regulation, 
as distinct from voter ID generally, imposed peculiar and dis-
proportionate burden on voters lacking conventional forms of 
identification.98  
With four separate opinions, no majority opinion, and in-
disputably heated rhetoric among the Justices who wrote, 
Crawford would seemingly provide unlikely support for the 
claim that a new consensus to election law is emerging in the 
Roberts Court.99 And yet, substantial consensus there was, at 
least among the six Justices who voted to affirm.100  
First, none of these Justices thought the strict standard 
from Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections controlled.101 Har-
per applied rigorous review to strike down Virginia’s $1.50 poll 
tax, deeming it an invidious and unjustified voter qualifica-
tion.102 Justice Douglas’s majority opinion struck down the poll 
tax law on its face and was indifferent to the fact that many 
voters presumably could comply with the requirement without 
difficulty.103 Justice Stevens’s opinion in Crawford cited Har-
per,104 but never really explained why Indiana’s identification 
requirement is not functionally like a poll tax. Justice Scalia 
cited Harper in a manner that suggested an intent to limit the 
decision to its facts.105 
 
 96. Id. at 1624. 
 97. Id. at 1643 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 98. Id. at 1643–45 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 99. See It Could Have Been Worse, supra note 89 (describing the Court’s 
decision as splintered and stating that “Crawford accentuates the lack of cohe-
rence in the Court’s jurisprudence when it comes to election law”). 
 100. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1613, 1624. 
 101. See, e.g., id. at 1615–16, 1624. 
 102. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666, 670 (1966). 
 103. See Hasen, supra note 59. 
 104. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1615–16. 
 105. Id. at 1626 n.* (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[W]e have never held that leg-
islatures must calibrate all election laws, even those totally unrelated to mon-
ey, for their impacts on poor voters.”); see also It Could Have Been Worse, su-
pra note 89.  
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As important, all six Justices voting to affirm in Crawford 
appeared to agree that Indiana could permissibly make voting 
more difficult for a select class of voters. Justice Scalia said so 
emphatically,106 but Justice Stevens accepted the idea as well, 
albeit less explicitly.107 Following Washington State Grange, 
Justice Stevens’s opinion in Crawford left open the prospect of 
an as-applied challenge, while intimating that almost all of the 
conduct the plaintiffs challenged was permissible.108 Indeed, 
Crawford, more forcefully than Washington State Grange, sug-
gested that few, if any, as-applied challenges will succeed.109  
Justice Stevens identified several classes of voters for 
whom the ID requirement imposed “a somewhat heavier bur-
den” and made voting more difficult: the elderly, the homeless, 
those for whom “economic or other personal limitations” inter-
fere with acquisition of a birth certificate or other documents 
needed to obtain state-issued identification, and voters who re-
fused to be photographed for religious reasons.110 The opinion, 
however, found the record insufficient to allow the Court to 
“quantify either the magnitude of the burden on this narrow 
class of voters or the portion of the burden imposed on them 
that is fully justified.”111  
This statement indicates some openness to the possibility 
that better evidence might establish a severe and unjustified 
burden, at least for some discrete groups of voters. But the opi-
nion also repeatedly suggests that such a burden would arise 
only if voters found themselves wholly unable to vote.112 At 
several junctures, Justice Stevens emphasized that the admit-
tedly “heavier” burden some voters confront was also a sur-
mountable one, both because the law provided varied ways for 
voters to comply, and because, in practice, the limited evidence 
collected showed that some informed and diligent voters were 
in fact able to comply.113  
 
 106. See Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1625.  
 107. Id. at 1621–24 (plurality opinion). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 1622–24. 
 110. Id. at 1621. 
 111. Id. at 1622. 
 112. Id. at 1613–14, 1620–23. 
 113. Id. at 1621–22. 
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The record in Crawford was indisputably thin.114 But it 
was nevertheless sufficient to reinforce what the Indiana law 
did on its face: namely, it made voting more difficult for a dis-
crete class of voters. The law required additional effort from 
some, and the effort required was far from inconsequential. The 
issue of whether Indiana may lawfully do so was debatable be-
fore Crawford, but not afterward, given Justice Stevens’s ap-
parent comfort with the idea. So long as voters lacking conven-
tional ID do not claim “a personal inability to vote,” they 
apparently have no cause for complaint, and an unwillingness 
to take the inconvenient steps the law requires does not 
amount to an “inability” to vote.115  
By suggesting (and perhaps holding) that voters dissuaded 
but not wholly precluded from voting suffer no cognizable in-
jury, the plurality opinion seems to reject the core injury the 
plaintiffs alleged in the lawsuit. As Professor Dan Tokaji ex-
plained, the alleged injury was not that the burdens imposed by 
the ID requirement were wholly insurmountable.116 Some vot-
ers will, of course, “go through the hoops” to obtain the ID, but 
others will not “wait in a line at the BMV to get photo ID, only 
to wait in another in order to vote.”117  
Those last voters will not vote in Indiana. Crawford finds 
no constitutional defect with a system that has this effect,118 
and was designed with awareness of it,119 and arguably specifi-
cally to produce it. In this sense, Crawford follows López 
Torres, in that both decisions focus rigidly on legal rather than 
practical impediments to participation.120 Because Indiana’s 
law did not wholly preclude anyone from voting, but instead 
imposed steps to be taken by voters lacking the requisite ID,121 
a sufficiently informed and diligent voter lacking conventional 
ID should still be able to vote. That the law indisputably 
 
 114. See Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Memo: At Supreme Court, 5-to-
4 Rulings Fade, but Why?, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2008, at A1 (calling the record 
“nonexistent”). 
 115. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1621–22. 
 116. It Could Have Been Worse, supra note 89. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1624. 
 119. See id. at 1623–24. 
 120. See id.; see also N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. López Torres (López 
Torres III), 128 S. Ct. 791, 801 (2008). 
 121. See Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1621–23; John Fund, Sister Act: Is Indi-
ana Really Disfranchising Elderly Nuns?, WSJ.COM, May 8, 2008, http://online 
.wsj.com/article/SB121018485894374391.html?mod=opinion_journal_political_
diary. 
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created obstacles that many voters simply will not over-
come122—not because compliance is wholly impossible, but be-
cause it is burdensome—was of no consequence.  
Diligence might arguably be a proper prerequisite to par-
ticipation, at least if concerns about fraud and its perception 
factor into the calculus.123 Justice Stevens seemed to think so, 
but never quite said as much. Instead, he seemed content, as 
was the Court in López Torres, to concentrate on formal legal 
access,124 with little concern for the practical burdens that arise 
under the system. The approach gives States license to struc-
ture electoral processes to impose barriers to participation, sub-
ject only to the most limited constraint that they not be legally 
impossible to traverse. Reality no longer has anything to do 
with it.125 
D.  RESTORING EXECUTIVE APPOINTMENT 
Unlike López Torres, Washington State Grange, and Craw-
ford, Riley v. Kennedy was a purely statutory case. While the 
question it addressed under the Voting Rights Act (VRA) was 
obscure, the decision advanced an approach that complements 
the stance underlying the three election cases that preceded it. 
Like the others, Riley suggests a retreat from the federal regu-
lation of state elections, although the Riley Court cut back not 
on its own role but instead narrowly construed the reach of a 
federal statute that it had previously interpreted expansive-
ly.126 
 
 122. Cf. Bruce Ackerman & Jennifer Nou, Hey, What About the 24th?, 
SLATE, May 2, 2008, http://www.slate.com/id/2190372 (noting that the Indiana 
law creates additional burdens of money, time, and effort that may amount to 
humiliation on the part of the voter). 
 123. See Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1617, 1618–21; id. at 1636 (Souter, J., dis-
senting) (“There is no denying the abstract importance, the compelling nature, 
of combating voter fraud.”).  
 124. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1623–24 (plurality opinion). 
 125. See Vikram David Amar, What the Supreme Court’s Recent Decision 
Upholding Indiana’s Voter ID Law Tells Us About the Court, Beyond the Area 
of Election Law, FINDLAW, May 8, 2008, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/amar/ 
20080508.html (“It doesn’t take a genius to see that relegating plaintiffs to ‘as 
applied’ challenges in these kinds of cases doesn’t really leave them with 
much.”); Hasen, supra note 59 (commenting pre-Crawford that if the Court 
upholds the Indiana law, “poor and minority voters will hardly have a 
chance”). 
 126. Riley v. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. 1970, 1982–87 (2008). 
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Riley involved a factually complex dispute arising under 
the VRA.127 Distilled to its most basic facts, the dispute con-
cerned the status under the VRA of a 1985 Alabama law that 
required that midterm vacancies on the Mobile County Com-
mission be filled by special election rather than gubernatorial 
appointment, as had been the prior practice.128 In 1988, the Al-
abama Supreme Court struck down the 1985 law as a violation 
of the Alabama State Constitution, but only after a special elec-
tion had already been held and the victor served approximately 
fourteen months on the County Commission.129 Riley presented 
the question whether Alabama could resume filling midterm 
vacancies by executive appointment without first obtaining 
federal approval to do so.130  
As a covered jurisdiction under the VRA,131 Alabama must 
obtain federal approval, known as preclearance, before imple-
menting a change to any election practice that is “in force or ef-
fect.” Filling by appointment an office previously filled by elec-
tion is a type of electoral change that has been long held to 
require federal preclearance.132 Alabama did not dispute this in 
Riley, and instead maintained that the 1985 law mandating 
elections to fill midterm vacancies in the Mobile County Com-
mission had never been “in force or effect” within the meaning 
of the VRA.133 The law was challenged as a violation of the 
state constitution at the first moment a challenge was possible, 
and while the trial court initially upheld it, the Alabama Su-
preme Court subsequently struck it down.134 In these circums-
tances, the State argued, the invalidated election law should 
not be the baseline against which the return to gubernatorial 
appointment should be measured.135 
A three-judge federal district court disagreed. Judge Myron 
H. Thompson’s brief opinion for the unanimous panel suggested 
the judges thought the case was straightforward.136 Citing 
 
 127. Id. at 1976–82. 
 128. Id. at 1978. 
 129. Id. at 1978–79. 
 130. Id. at 1976. 
 131. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973c(a) (West Supp. 2008). 
 132. See, e.g., Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 550–51, 569–72 
(1969). 
 133. Riley, 128 S. Ct. at 1982–87. 
 134. Id. at 1978–79. 
 135. See id. at 1979–80. 
 136. See Kennedy v. Riley, 445 F. Supp. 2d 1333 (M.D. Ala. 2006), rev’d, 
Riley v. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. 1970 (2008). 
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what the panel viewed as settled precedent, Judge Thompson 
found that the 1985 Act had been “put into force and effect” 
when a new commissioner was elected pursuant to it, and ac-
cordingly constituted the baseline practice against which ex-
ecutive appointment should be evaluated.137  
The Supreme Court reversed in a 7-2 vote.138 Justice Gins-
burg’s opinion for the Court sympathized with the awkward po-
sition in which the State found itself. After the District Court’s 
order, the Justice Department objected to Alabama’s preclear-
ance submission, finding that the resumption of gubernatorial 
appointment “appears to diminish the opportunity of minority 
voters to elect a representative of their choice to the Mobile 
County Commission.”139 The State consequently found itself 
needing to fill a commission vacancy with an election that the 
Alabama Supreme Court had previously held would violate the 
state constitution.140 
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion holds that the election was not 
required because preclearance was not necessary. Acknowledg-
ing that precedent supported the lower court’s holding, she 
wrote that the dispute would be “a close case” but for an “ex-
traordinary circumstance” that “impel[s]” the conclusion that 
the 1985 Act was never “in force or effect.”141 This case, wrote 
Justice Ginsburg, was different from the relevant precedent be-
cause it involved a state electoral practice that had both been 
challenged “at first opportunity,” and had been invalidated by 
the state supreme court.142 In this “circumstance,” the Court 
found that the Act had never been “in force or effect,” and thus 
preclearance was not required.143  
By placing dispositive weight on a “circumstance” the 
Court had not previously confronted, Justice Ginsburg sought 
to limit the holding to the odd facts Riley presented.144 But 
while Riley offered a narrow ruling in an unusual case, aspects 
 
 137. Id. at 1336 (citing City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 U.S. 125, 133 
(1983)). 
 138. Riley, 128 S. Ct. at 1976. 
 139. Letter from Wan J. Kim, Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, to Troy King, Att’y Gen., State of Ala. and John J. Park, Jr., 
Assistant Att’y Gen., State of Ala. 3 (Jan. 8, 2007), available at http://www 
.votelaw.com/blog/blogdocs/DOJ objection letter 2007 01 08.pdf.  
 140. See Riley, 128 S. Ct. at 1978–80. 
 141. Id. at 1984. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 1976, 1984. 
 144. See id.  
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of both the majority and dissenting opinions suggest a new ap-
proach to the VRA that supplements the stance the Roberts 
Court took in the constitutional election decisions earlier last 
Term.  
Most prominently, and as noted by Justice Stevens in dis-
sent, the majority’s approach failed to give Section 5 of the VRA 
the “broadest possible scope”145 and hence was “not faithful” to 
precedent that has long shown the Court inclined to do just 
that.146 The Roberts Court might well have been expected to 
stray from an interpretative mandate the Warren Court an-
nounced nearly four decades ago. The Court’s stance in Riley, 
however, also departed from that of the Rehnquist Court on the 
specific statutory question presented in the case. With only one 
significant exception,147 the Rehnquist Court repeatedly con-
strued Section 5 broadly when confronted with the question 
whether a change was of the sort for which preclearance was re-
quired. In case after case, the Court expanded the types of deci-
sions subject to preclearance and stiffened the penalties for a ju-
risdiction’s failure to obtain it.148  
Prominent among these decisions is the Rehnquist Court’s 
1999 decision in Lopez v. Monterey County, California.149 Ac-
 
 145. Id. at 1987 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Allen v. State Bd. of Elec-
tions, 393 U.S. 544, 567 (1969)). 
 146. Id. 
 147. See Presley v. Etowah County Comm’n, 502 U.S. 491, 494, 504 (1992) 
(holding section five inapplicable to a resolution altering the powers exercised 
by elected county commissioners because applying section five to such changes 
would work “an unconstrained expansion of its coverage,” given that 
“[i]nnumerable” local enactments unrelated to voting affect the power of 
elected officials). 
 148. See, e.g., Lopez v. Monterey County, Cal., 525 U.S. 266, 280–82, 287 
(1999); Foreman v. Dallas County, Tex., 521 U.S. 979, 980 (1997); Young v. 
Fordice, 520 U.S. 273, 290–91 (1997); Lopez v. Monterey County, Cal., 519 
U.S. 9, 22–25 (1996); Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S. 186, 200–06, 
210 (1996); Clark v. Roemer, 500 U.S. 646, 652–55, 660 (1991); City of Pleasant 
Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462, 471 (1987). See generally Ellen D. Katz, Fe-
deralism, Preclearance, and the Rehnquist Court, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1179, 1208–10 
(2001) (discussing trends of the Rehnquist Court when confronted with section 
five issues). However, the Rehnquist Court repeatedly has construed the VRA 
narrowly when addressing the distinct question of whether a change in elec-
toral practice met the necessary substantive standard for implementation. See 
Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 477–82 (2003); Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. 
Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 328–36 (2000); Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 95–98 
(1997); Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 480 (1997); Katz, supra, 
at 1209–10. 
 149. 525 U.S. 266 (1999). 
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knowledging the “substantial ‘federalism costs’”150 resulting 
from the VRA’s “federal intrusion into sensitive areas of state 
and local policymaking,”151 Lopez recognized that the Recon-
struction Amendments “contemplate” this encroachment into 
realms “traditionally reserved to the States.”152 Lopez affirmed 
as constitutionally permissible the infringement that the VRA’s 
Section 5 preclearance process “by its nature” effects on state 
sovereignty,153 and applied Section 5 broadly, finding that a 
county’s nondiscretionary implementation of state law must be 
precleared.154  
Nine years later, Riley adopted a very different stance 
when the Court again confronted the question of whether a 
challenged electoral practice must be precleared prior to im-
plementation. Absent from Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion 
is Lopez’s reflexive acceptance of Section 5’s “federal intrusion” 
into state sovereignty.155 In its place is remarkable concern 
about the very federalism costs that the Court in Lopez so wil-
lingly tolerated.156 Specifically, Justice Ginsburg worried that 
mandating preclearance in Riley would interfere too greatly 
with the power of the Alabama Supreme Court, and, by exten-
sion, with state supreme courts more generally.157 Mandating 
preclearance, she wrote, effectively rendered the decision of the 
Alabama Supreme Court “inoperative,” and “would have the 
anomalous effect of binding Alabama to an unconstitutional 
practice because of a state trial court’s error.”158 Such a 
mandate “interfere[d] with a state supreme court’s ability to 
determine the content of state law,” and hence gave rise to a 
distinct “burden.”159 Justice Ginsburg stated that “the preroga-
tive of the Alabama Supreme Court to say what Alabama law is 
merits respect in federal forums.”160  
Justice Ginsburg, of course, had said this before. Her dis-
cussion in Riley closely tracked her dissent in Bush v. Gore, 
where she lambasted the Court for failing to defer to the judg-
 
 150. Id. at 282 (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 926 (1995)). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. (citing City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980)). 
 153. Id. at 284–85. 
 154. Id. at 282, 287. 
 155. Id. at 282. 
 156. Riley v. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. 1970, 1985–86 (2008). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 1985. 
 159. Id. at 1986. 
 160. Id. at 1985. 
 1636 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [93:1615 
 
ment of another state supreme court on what she understood to 
be question of state law.161 In his concurrence, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist had invoked several Warren Court decisions that he 
argued supported a federal judicial role in the presidential dis-
pute.162 Justice Ginsburg responded by berating the Chief Jus-
tice for “bracket[ing]” the Florida Supreme Court with “state 
high courts of the Jim Crow South.”163 
Riley showed Justice Ginsburg again defending a state su-
preme court, this time the Alabama Supreme Court. She 
pointed out the absence of any suggestion that the Alabama 
Supreme Court’s decisions “were anything other than reasona-
ble and impartial interpretations of controlling Alabama 
law.”164 She dismissed the dissent’s invocation of the Alabama 
Supreme Court’s complicity in the State’s Jim Crow past, not-
ing that the past misdeeds of the Alabama Supreme Court 
would have been subject to preclearance, had the VRA existed 
at the time, while the Court’s decision in Riley was simply dif-
ferent, falling outside what constitutes a “change” within the 
meaning of the VRA.165 
Justice Ginsburg’s consistency with regard to state court 
power would seem unremarkable, but for the fact that Riley 
was a VRA preclearance case. As the VRA’s most notorious and 
remarkable provision, the preclearance requirement reverses 
the presumption of validity that typically attaches to state and 
local governmental action, and mandates that jurisdictions sub-
ject to it obtain federal approval before changing any aspect of 
their electoral laws.166 Underlying this regime is the belief that 
state power in the voting realm—including state judicial pow-
er—is suspect until the State can demonstrate otherwise.167  
Under this regime, Justice Ginsburg’s confidence in the 
judgment of the state supreme court in Riley was misplaced—
not because it was factually inaccurate, but because it was le-
gally preempted. The premise of the VRA’s preclearance re-
quirement is that decisions by covered jurisdictions are, by de-
 
 161. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 136 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 162. Id. at 114–15 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 163. Id. at 141 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 164. Riley, 128 S. Ct. at 1986 n.12. 
 165. Id. at 1987 n.13. 
 166. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973c(a) (West Supp. 2008). 
 167. Ellen D. Katz, Not Like the South? Regional Variation and Political 
Participation Through the Lens of Section 2, in VOTING RIGHTS ACT REAUTHO-
RIZATION OF 2006: PERSPECTIVES ON DEMOCRACY, PARTICIPATION, AND POWER 
183, 183 (Ana Henderson ed., 2007). 
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finition, suspect. While this premise alone does not resolve 
whether Alabama’s return to gubernatorial appointment should 
have been deemed a change subject to preclearance, it suggests 
that neither the state court’s sound judgment nor its need for 
autonomy provide grounds to exempt the change from the stric-
tures of preclearance. 
Or at least it did. After Riley, all nine Justices appear un-
convinced. Justice Ginsburg, speaking for herself and six oth-
ers, protected Alabama’s power to resume a practice that the 
Department of Justice refused to preclear given its potential 
discriminatory effect on minority voters.168 Justice Stevens, 
joined by Justice Souter in dissent, would have retained federal 
review, but only reluctantly.169 The dissent wonders in dicta 
whether “it may well be true that today . . . maintaining strict 
federal controls . . . [is] not as necessary or appropriate as [it 
once was].”170 Riley accordingly exposes the Court’s deep skep-
ticism about the VRA and the continued federal intervention it 
mandates in state electoral affairs. 
II.  REDEFINING THE ELECTORATE:  
LEGAL LITERACY AND VOTER DILIGENCE   
López Torres, Washington Grange, Crawford, and Riley all 
limited federal involvement in state electoral disputes by mak-
ing clear that voters were not entitled to the federal assistance 
the plaintiffs sought in each case.171 Underlying all four is a 
distinct portrait of the American voter. Specifically, these deci-
sions advance the idea that voters must be both legally literate 
and diligent.  
A.  LEGAL LITERACY 
Formal literacy tests have long been outlawed,172 and the 
recent decisions hardly suggest a desire to resurrect such tests. 
They nevertheless both assume and require that voters en-
gaged in the political process possess a sophisticated under-
 
 168. Riley, 128 S. Ct. at 1976, 1980, 1982, 1984. 
 169. Id. at 1987, 1993–94 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 170. Id. at 1987. 
 171. Riley, 128 S. Ct. at 1982, 1984 (majority opinion); Crawford v. Marion 
County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1623–24 (2008); Wash. State Grange v. 
Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1193, 1196 (2008); N.Y. State 
Bd. of Elections v. López Torres (López Torres III), 128 S. Ct. 791, 799–801 
(2008). 
 172. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 646–47 (1966). 
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standing of the rules that govern elections. The decisions from 
last Term credit voters with knowing and understanding the 
law in considerable detail, and with grasping the significance of 
complex legal developments. In short, they render meaningful 
political participation dependent on legal literacy. 
The importance of legal literacy emerges nascently in 
López Torres with the decision’s replacement of “realism” re-
view with an exclusive focus on legal rather than practical bur-
dens.173 Through this circumscribed lens, the challenged regu-
lations are not obviously burdensome. To be sure, the district 
court in López Torres found that that the state’s ballot access 
requirements were functionally insurmountable, the existing 
primary system a nullity, and the lobbying of delegates fruit-
less,174 and the Supreme Court never disputed these findings. 
The Court held, however, that state law was not the cause, or 
more precisely, was not the direct cause, and that the burdens 
observed stemmed most directly from decisions by party lead-
ers to do things like run a coordinated slate of delegates incap-
able of deliberation.175 López Torres suggests that if party 
members are unhappy with such practices, they should change 
them or replace the leaders who implemented them.176 Doing 
so, of course, requires that party members—as voters and chal-
lenger candidates—understand which parts of the nomination 
process are state-mandated, and which are derived from party 
practice in response to those mandates. López Torres expects 
party members to understand that state law is not the direct 
cause of the problems that exist. The suggestion is that a legal-
ly literate voter can be expected to so understand. 
The concept of legal literacy emerges in more developed 
form in Washington State Grange. Emphasizing the facial na-
ture of the challenge, Justice Thomas’s majority opinion rejects 
as “sheer speculation” the notion that voters might be confused 
by a candidate’s party preference and might view such a candi-
date as the party’s approved nominee.177 Justice Thomas said 
explicitly that “a well-informed electorate” should not be pre-
 
 173. López Torres III, 128 S. Ct. at 797–99. 
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sumed to make such an error.178 This electorate would know 
that the party designation is a preference, not a nomination, 
because, in fact, that is what the law says. The law, after all, 
never referred to the top-two candidates “as nominees of any 
party, nor does it treat them as such.”179 Well-informed voters 
are presumed to be aware of this. 
No such presumption attached eight years earlier when the 
Court decided California Democratic Party v. Jones.180 That de-
cision struck down the blanket primary as intrusion on party 
autonomy, in part because participation by nonmembers 
threatened to alter the identity or qualities of the ultimate par-
ty nominee.181 A well-informed electorate would presumably 
have understood and appreciated that the nominee who pre-
vails in the blanket primary may well be different from the one 
securing the nomination when primaries are wholly closed. 
Such victors were legally designated party nominees, to be 
sure, but well-informed voters would presumably understand 
that nominees differ depending on the legal regime that allows 
for their selection. The Court in California Democratic Party 
nevertheless expressed no interest in what the electorate might 
know or could be expected to understand, and instead struck 
down the law as unduly burdensome on a facial challenge.182 
Washington State Grange, by contrast, preserved a closely re-
lated law by crediting the understanding of an informed electo-
rate versed in legal nuance.183 
Riley v. Kennedy likewise assumed a legally literate electo-
rate. Justice Ginsburg’s opinion made clear that not every situ-
ation in which a state law is found to violate the state constitu-
tion would be immune from the strictures of preclearance. 
Instead, she emphasized that narrow and specific circums-
tances had rendered Section 5 inapplicable to the Alabama dis-
pute.184 Justice Ginsburg wrote that the state law that at-
tempted to supplant gubernatorial appointment with special 
elections to fill midterm vacancies in the Mobile County Com-
mission “was challenged in state court at first opportunity, the 
lone election was held in the shadow of that legal challenge, 
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and the Act was ultimately invalidated by the Alabama Su-
preme Court.”185  
All three conditions are apparently required to detach the 
preclearance obligation, but it is the second that is most inter-
esting for present purposes. Why should the fact that the elec-
tion occurred in the “shadow of [a] legal challenge”186 matter? 
Justice Ginsburg offered no explanation, but one possibility is 
that this “shadow” informed voters that the new law had yet to 
supplant fully the prior practice. The pending legal dispute 
meant the ultimate status of the election law remained unset-
tled. Its “shadow” told voters that the election in which they 
were voting was a tenuous and possibly fleeting participatory 
experience.  
In other words, the “shadow” of the legal dispute insulated 
minority voters from experiencing the harm the preclearance 
requirement guards against, namely, electoral changes that 
diminish opportunities for minority political participation. 
While a move from elections to appointment is a classic exam-
ple of such a “retrogressive” change,187 Riley posits that the ul-
timate invalidity of the election law caused no retrogression in 
Mobile.188 The “shadow” hanging over the election in which mi-
nority voters participated informed them that their voting ex-
perience was provisional at best. It provided notice that the re-
turn to appointment took away nothing from their participatory 
opportunities. 
Some voters may have grasped the significance of the law-
suit’s “shadow.” But doing so required knowledge that a lawsuit 
had been filed that called the election into question, that a 
state trial court’s dismissal of that lawsuit prior to the election 
did permanently establish the law’s validity, and that the pend-
ing appeal to the Alabama Supreme Court was sufficient to 
render the election’s status uncertain. Only the most legally li-
terate voter could be expected to make such observations. In-
deed, even the three-judge district court missed the last point.  
B.  VOTER DILIGENCE 
Diligence emerges as a prerequisite to voting most explicit-
ly in Crawford. Justice Stevens’s lead opinion posits that voters 
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lacking conventional forms of identification need not necessari-
ly suffer an undue burden under the identification law because 
various venues exist through which a diligent voter might se-
cure ID, or otherwise validate a provisional ballot cast without 
identification.189  
Justice Stevens acknowledged, for instance, that Indiana’s 
regime created “difficulty” for some elderly voters lacking birth 
certificates, but highlighted how one named plaintiff was able 
to obtain her birth certificate, had the ability to pay the birth 
certificate fee, and “intended” to return to the Bureau of Motor 
Vehicles to get her identification.190 Justice Stevens also 
pointed out that the absence of public transportation in parts of 
Indiana was irrelevant because that absence indicated nothing 
about how frequently the poor and elderly might venture to the 
BMV “during a routine outing with family or friends” or on vis-
its arranged by private civic and political groups.191  
Justice Stevens also pointedly noted that any burden im-
posed by the ID requirement “is, of course, mitigated” by the 
ability of voters without qualifying ID to cast provisional bal-
lots and have them counted, so long as the voter visited a cir-
cuit court clerk’s office within ten days of the election to execute 
an affidavit about why they lacked the requisite identifica-
tion.192 Justice Stevens said that this requirement was “unlike-
ly . . . [to] pose a constitutional problem,” save perhaps for vot-
ers who refused to be photographed for religious reasons, and 
hence would have to make this circuit court trip for every elec-
tion.193  
In short, Justice Stevens seemed to recognize that Indi-
ana’s law made voting more difficult for some voters, that the 
effort needed to comply was facially significant, and that the 
requirements might dissuade some voters from voting.194 So 
long, however, as these voters do not find themselves wholly 
unable to vote, the plurality opinion suggested they suffered no 
cognizable injury.195 Diligence emerges as a functional and 
permissible prerequisite to voting.  
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  CONCLUSION   
 Last Term’s decisions suggest a systematic move by the 
Roberts Court to abandon active review of state electoral pro-
cedures and to curb federal regulation of such processes more 
generally. This suggestion, of course, may be illusory. Supreme 
Court decisions are easy to over-read and intentions may erro-
neously be attributed to Justices who never harbored such sen-
timents. 
But insofar as a new, unified approach to election law is 
emerging, last Term’s decisions suggest it has at least two 
prominent features. The approach makes meaningful political 
participation contingent on knowledge and skills that many 
voters simply lack. Legal literacy and diligence have become 
functional prerequisites to voting. The new approach, moreo-
ver, promises little and perhaps no federal assistance when 
voters fall short in what is required. 
The Justices, of course, know that voters will fall short. 
The decisions allude to this circumstance and anticipate vari-
ous actors will emerge to fill the void. The Court suggests that 
political parties have appropriate incentives to assist voters as 
they navigate the system—hence the standing granted to the 
Democratic Party in Crawford196—and to ensure that voters 
properly understand the legal regimes within which they act—
by, for instance, making clear the significance of a candidate’s 
party preference in Washington’s top-two primary.197 
The Court, however, seems to envision assistance by others 
as well. In Crawford, Justice Stevens made reference to the 
employees who staff homeless shelters, relatives and friends 
inclined to orchestrate outings to the BMV for elderly voters, 
and the staff of civic and political organizations.198 These are 
the people who thus far have prevented Indiana’s voter ID re-
quirement from becoming unduly burdensome, at least in a fa-
cial challenge, and it is their anticipated assistance that will 
likely lead the Court to turn back any as-applied challenge that 
might be brought.199  
 
 196. See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 951 (7th 
Cir. 2007) (finding that the “Democratic Party . . . has standing to assert the 
rights of those of its members who will be prevented from voting by the new 
law”). 
 197. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 
1192–93 (2008). 
 198. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1623 n.20. 
 199. See supra notes 190, 191 and accompanying text. 
 2009] RETREAT FROM ELECTION LAW 1643 
 
The election decisions from the 2007 Term anticipate that 
private individuals will play an increasingly crucial role within 
election law. While such assistance hardly signals the whole-
sale privatization of election administration, it reveals an im-
plicit delegation of power. As the Court retreats from its 
longstanding role as the primary guardian of voting rights, pri-
vate individuals and organizations are emerging as the most 
likely replacement.  
